Last week the United Nations officially made a request to the Dutch government to lengthen their stay in Afghan province Uruzgan. However much the CDA (Christian Democracts) would like to fulfil that demand, it would take a miracle to make it happen.
Especially Labour (abbreviated for purposes of clarity, the actual name is ‘Partij van de Arbeid) refuses to let go of the last agreement, in which a withdrawal was scheduled to take place in August 2010. Despite requests from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and UN Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen, they have made it very clear that they will not give in.

Most readily to spring to mind are new elections, to be held within a time span of three months. The current coalition was one where forces were constantly pulling the others in a direction unwanted from ideological perspectives. This lead to socialists labelling government as asocial, while right-wingers couldn’t resist stressing the lack of libertarian principles. And in a way that was correct. Health care hung in between by having some active market principles in stock -while other more crucial ones were left out-, education received too little attention and the number of policemen rose, but was unequally spread over districts.

There is an easier way to summarize the past three years under Balkenende, however. When looking at voter preferences, most are driven towards the right, even though the crisis is ‘said to have come from the right’. The more Labour blunders, the more liberals thrive. As I see it, that is a satisfactory explanation of both why libertarians are doing well in the polls, as well as why CDA is losing yet still likely to end up in the next coalition. Perception is the key word here, and for many it tells a story where the Christian Democrats were held back by especially Labour and to a lesser extent the Christian Union (the other coalition partner). And as a centre right party, much of what CDA aspires to is still attracting voters.

Then there is the stance they took in the last debates culminating in the coalition’s end. It was one of openness, one where all alternatives were regarded as worthy of attention, even if by instinct all knew that they planned on supporting the NATO by staying in Uruzgan. Wouter Bos, Labour’s party leader, was the exact opposite: No doubt about it, by the end of 2010 all Dutch troops would be gone from Afghanistan. Polls suggest most people agree that we ought to leave, and as past promises spoke clearly along the same line much could be said for Bos’ position. But, as often, there are two sides to a coin. CDA had more to go on that blind faith in America, or indeed a history of trailing the NATO. Ben Bot, who is a former UN-diplomat and minister, says that Holland is making a fool of itself by wasting their carefully crafted image on the international scene: “It isn’t about what you have done; it is about what you are doing”.

The aim of his argument is international influence. You can’t, being as small as the Netherlands, demand to be heard and listened to, while neglecting those tasks that grant exactly these privileges. There is some truth to his message. The Netherlands would have never received the praise it had from Clinton if no participation took place, let alone that Fogh Rasmussen would have labelled their work in Uruzgan as ‘the standard’ for all countries. Their chances of receiving invitations to G-tops now seem to be slim, as are any visits or phone calls to high ranked US officials. That is, if we are to believe the pessimistic scenarios. That is not the question, however. The question is whether or not achieving a better reputation is enough to justify lengthening a stay in an already unpopular war.

On the whole, I would say it is not. It is an odd thing to perceive so much talk about what is in our interest, while the most important request of all gets so little attention: The one made by the governor of Uruzgan. Not because Afghan politics is reliable, by all standards it is not, but because he governs on a level that has actual input to the lives of Afghans (unlike president Karzai). Being part of a representative democracy, we had a choice: A war, or no war? The same cannot be said of the people living in the region where our troops are located. Instead of focusing on what is in our best interest, we should be focusing on why we are there. If that cause is still a legitimate one, then we ought not to leave. And are we to leave, then another will have to take over. Canada might be a candidate, though whichever country it is, it will have to start from scratch. Rebuilding bases, trust and connections takes valuable time and money.

Labour is right that NATO could have prepared itself for a take-over for a long time. That it did not is wholly its own fault. Once again, perception becomes a keyword here. I don’t think that they for a moment considered the fact we would leave, while most of our allies were either staying well put or increasing troop numbers. Confusion is omnipresent at the UN when it comes to another strange way of handling matters, for it is not their usual way of working to make an official request as long as no clear consensus seems to have been reached, as these are internal affairs. The UN wasn’t trying to grab hold of the last straw either, it send out its wish for a prolonging of Dutch presence because the Dutch government itself cleared the way for them to do so, by implying it had reached consensus. Bos was outraged by Verhagen’s statement (foreign affairs), but later admitted he had been kept up to date. In any case, cabinet negotiations had more go on with this request in the back of their minds. Meanwhile, the UN apparently assumed it had all been settled; why else pave the way for an official request?

Sadly for the Christian Democrats, not to mention the Afghan civilians, the prevailing point of view seems to be that the west’s own economic crisis and other internal problems are hard enough to cope with without a war in the Middle East to fight. And CDA might have sympathizers, they lack actual allies. Meaning it is not only very unlikely that their mission will continue after the already set deadline, but now virtually impossible as a missionary cabinet will not get a say on the issue. The only hope for NATO is a rapid election, with a super majority in favour of the Afghan war, which would amount to saying all American republicans suddenly started voting for government run healthcare scheme.

Last week the United Nations officially made a request to the Dutch government to lengthen their stay in Afghan province Uruzgan. However much the Christian Democrats (CDA) would like to fulfil that demand, each day that passes makes this less likely to happen.

Especially Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid) refuses to let go of the last agreement, in which a withdrawal was scheduled to take place in August 2010. Despite requests from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and UN Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen, they have made it very clear that they will not give in.

Ben Bot, who is a former UN-diplomat and minister, says that Holland is making a fool of itself by wasting their carefully crafted image on the international scene: “It isn’t about what you have done; it is about what you are doing”. The aim of his argument is international influence. You can’t, being as small as the Netherlands, demand to be heard and listened to, while neglecting those tasks that grant exactly these privileges.

There is some truth to his message. The Netherlands would have never received the praise it had from Clinton if no participation took place, let alone that Fogh Rasmussen would have labelled their work in Uruzgan as ‘the standard’ for all countries. That is not the question, however. The question is whether or not achieving a better reputation is enough to justify lengthening a stay in an already unpopular war.

On the whole, I would say it is not. It is an odd thing to perceive so much talk about what is in our interest, while the most important request of all gets so little attention: The one made by the governor of Uruzgan. Not because Afghan politics is reliable, by all standards it is not, but because he governs on a level that has actual input to the lives of Afghans (unlike president Karzai).

Being part of a representative democracy, we had a choice: A war, or no war? The same cannot be said of the people living in the region where our troops are located. Instead of focusing on what is in our best interest, we should be focusing on why we are there. If that cause is still a legitimate one, then we ought not to leave. And are we to leave, then another will have to take over. Canada might be a candidate, though whichever country it is, it will have to start from scratch. Rebuilding bases, trust and connections takes valuable time and money.

Sadly for the Christian Democrats, the prevailing point of view seems to be that the west’s own economic crisis and other internal problems are hard enough to cope with without a war in the Middle East to fight. And they might have sympathizers, but they lack actual allies.

Some Dutch politicians can make me laugh by their or lovely way of ‘delivering’ a message or setting an example, as if they are still a part of the old world order where Dutch ships ruled the waves and held an abnormal amount of power for such a small country . They like to take the lead in European matters, they like to talk about Iraq and Afghanistan as influential folks and they gave the Americans political support for their war in Iraq, though no military support. Last week, Dutch politician Koenders threatened to pull the plug out of financial support to Mr. Karzai, in hoping this will make him take corruption more seriously. I doubt it’ll make a difference, but I agree with him wholeheartedly, since Karzai does not make me feel that we are dealing with a reliable politician.

But we want Afghanistan to be peaceful, so we will have to deal with him. There are many doubts about democracy in the region already, concerning the impossibility of ‘imposing’ democracy which is surely true, since you cannot force someone to be democratic. Iraq serves as ammunition for this argument, yet this no longer seems fully justified. The extent to which it has been stabilized is pretty impressive. Yes, recent violence points in another direction, but so do the targets at which it was aimed. The extent to which Iraqis are participating in dialogue is also surprising; with elections coming up political parties even seem prepared to set cultural and ideological differences aside.  And that is good to see, especially with foreign forces leaving Iraq sooner rather than later. This, in combination with the obscure future of Afghanistan, confronts us with dilemmas: Should we leave either of the two countries?

Iraq

On the whole, I think not. I don’t think we should leave either of them behind. Many politicians seem to think so too, despite falling public support of both projects. On the issue of Iraq there is little choice left. Obama made a firm promise during his electoral campaign, and he will be ridiculed if he now declares he’ll prolong the stay. Being ridiculed might be bad for his current reputation, acting like a fool will do him no favors in the long run. The war in Iraq has cost fortunes, lives, patience and time, but it did not, contrary to many opinions probably based on the illegitimacy of the war, sent the country on the road to ruins. It is much safer than it used to be and recent violence was not aimed at any western army in particular. If it was aimed at anything, then the current government can probably claim to be the would-be target, for American soldiers are no longer patrolling the streets, and why should they?

Their bases are located in parts less often seen by public eyes, which by means of less publicity is a good thing. Withdrawing them altogether, while they are so well-trained and equipped, is still something vulnerable to heavy doubts from more sides than you would have thought. In the past years the question has always been whether countries should withdraw or not, putting what is best for Iraq or what is a good way to achieve it not totally on the side-line, but rating it as of secondary importance.  That is not a good way to handle this matter. Iraqi forces might think they are up to the job in taking care of national security, but that doesn’t mean that they actually are. Experience and knowledge is not something you can expect from such a young organization, whereas the Americans and Europeans have plenty of it. A smaller group devoted to Iraq, aimed at handling emergency situations and training should be reconsidered, even if they are located outside of Iraq. The U.N. is especially weary of such an initiative, but it would be near failure if, in a time of crisis, we won’t be ready to lend a newly elected government a hand. We don’t want to stop democracy dead in its tracks.

With elections scheduled at the end of January next year, it will be important to take precautions. The Americans are leaving Iraq no later than 2011, though up till then it seems at least 50,000 troops will stay put, taking care of just the job they should be taking care of: Training Iraqi’s. This is especially important because no one knows how next year elections will turn out, though everyone fears one that is splattered with blood, since the attacks by Al-Qaeda are generally arbitrary and take much civilian toll. If the elections succeed the question will be how the newly elected government will cope with violence, unstable stability and domestic issues.

The best way to satisfy your people is by creating more wealth, security and better institutions. Those are no easy targets indeed, but since health care and electricity have been extremely poor over the last years, we have good hopes that improvement will be all the more noticeable.  Better electricity networks might also have positive effects on the reliability of mobile phone networks, which are immensely popular: Over 20 million people use them on a 27 million population. Trade also needs a boost. Oil is the first that springs to mind, but to sell more oil infrastructure and stability are once again of the greatest importance. And a reminder that it is unwise to bet on one horse: Economies should not be dependant solely on one product, diversity is a must. A slight focus on the Kurds might do well. They hold a strategic position when it comes to trade. If the government will be able to make a deal with them, then options might at last be open for better trade relations with for instance Turkey, which will give the economy another big boost.

And Afghanistan?

Afghanistan is of course totally different. Subtracting more forces is possible only in the most unlikely of events. Obama is careful not to tread on important toes, or as I sometimes think he does not want to tread on anyone’s toes at all. He does this for obvious reasons: Slam a door and you’ll be in trouble when you want to go back. Afghanistan is not something you will go back to however. His army, and hopefully that of several European countries as well, is not going anywhere.

This makes Afghanistan much more difficult than Iraq. The latter might force us to ask painful questions, but at least we as good as know that we’ll leave anyway, even if only because the American people will not accept anything else. Our greatest problem is that we do not know who is able to make the best decisions.  Should it be general McCrystal? He is the general, well-respected and above all well informed on the situation. His requests and proposals shouldn’t be rejected out of hand therefore. We need not worry, because Obama isn’t doing so: He is considering extra troops; 40.000 if the general gets his way, less if he is set for compromising. I deem the latter to be more likely, since such grand enforcements are neither cheap nor popular.  It is clear however, that the “war of necessity” has lost it claim as a correct title. Complete withdrawal is no option yet, but the fact that political willingness to extend troop-numbers is a lot less heard than ‘staying a little longer’ should put you on your guard.

Among money and bitter prospects, corruption is one of the reasons. And this is what Dutch politician Koenders aimed at when talking about Afghan-support, and also why I had to snigger. Karzai and his men would not get a promised 25 million Euros of aid-money as long as they did not fight corruption. I don’t think it’ll make much of a difference. I doubt even whether Karzai knows as much as the existence of our country. Bu no 25 million Euros if nothing gets done, and rightly so.

Karzai will be sworn into office as an illegitimate president soon. The elections were a huge fraud, and his government stronghold remains filled with corrupt officials and friends. And like the Dutch, Karzai and his countrymen probably like to think of themselves as important. They are, if not for world peace then at least for peace and welfare in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is no mean feat as we should not forget. That is also the reason why we should not neglect or leave the issue unresolved.

Whether we need 20.000 more men or 40.000 in order to stabilize Afghanistan is beside the point, because anyone claiming less or no mission-expansion will be inclined either to leave or to propose a different way of fighting. Leaving would be a severe blow to the people of Afghanistan. It is not to their government that we owe anything, it is to those people, to whom, by entering warfare and promising to root out the Taliban and terrorists to western civilians, we also made a promise. On their lands has been fought, their crops have been devastated. And while we lost hundreds of soldiers, they lost thousands of family members, houses and large shares of their possessions. The price of this war has been put in money and in lives, but seldom in Arab numbers.

Amidst all the global talks on justice, global warming and nuclear powers, there are the troubled lives of rural Afghans. The world of grand politics is far away from their homes, because regional politics is what matters. Our aims should be focused at those we are trying to help, not at those who we are fighting as McCrystal reminded us when he reported on Afghanistan by stating that winning this war had to mean winning the hearts of the Afghan people, not killing more Taliban fighters. That is not something which is disputed much, and past experience seems to support his stance, although it doesn’t make it any easier. It’ll have to be done from top to bottom, but also the other way around. Karzai needs us, but we need him as well. So stopping the flow of incoming funds will not be an answer. Whatever Karzai’s fault may be, they’re not the faults of his people. By blocking money for development from coming into Afghanistan’s borders, you will punish the civilians. And we have done that before when, in our dogmatic ‘war on drugs’ poppy fields were burnt, leaving farmers behind with no decent alternative to make money. Such policies create anger, fury and hatred: As if we need any more of that.

So we need a good way to distribute available money, in order to get it where it is needed most. Some registration procedures and routine check-ups will be needed to make this happen, to which we might assign some U.N. or U.S.A. officials. But whatever we opt-for, it should be open to public scrutiny, with transparent processes, since many will have more confidence in international and daring-local journalists then in any government-official. Money should be spent on local projects that create labor, with an eye to the future. Infrastructure and schools should be two pillars, but easier goals can be set as well, such as improving farming efficiency and equipment. Above all, that should give rise to opportunities so desperately needed by Afghans to shape their own future.  If this is done well we can undermine their vulnerability to The Taliban as well, since social conditions with a lack of knowledge make them particularly prone to indoctrination by force of word or sword. Few will have heard of Facebook or Twitter, let alone have the means to make use of them, so their uprising is tied to locality and great personal risk.

That’ll be one long, hard road out of hell to speak more freely. But at least Koenders made our first step forwards clear: Obama and the EU should be much tougher in getting Mr. Karzai in line. He needs to fight the already mentioned corruption with a lot more vigor, but he should also redistribute his own power to the national parliament. Democracy as it is now will be victorious only by virtue of its name.

In the meantime someone needs to make a wake-up call to Europe. America has been accused of lies, treachery, oil-and money seeking intentions and arrogance, but we cannot accuse them of giving up easily. Despite loud shouts for an Iraqi and Afghanistan withdrawal, the first already hears new voices for a pro-longed stay; the latter can probably await more troops. Buried in the debris of the financial crisis, most European politicians seem to find their own quibbles over the use of bank bail-outs more important than raising the quality of living standards far away. For a continent that has global economical and political leadership on its agenda, that is a poor way to go.

We better hope Obama increases the number of soldiers in Afghanistan, as general McCrystal requested. The hearts and minds of the Afghan people remain unconquered territory. The general’s past reports have clearly indicated that killing more Taliban fighters will not win the battle for us. If this were the case, more soldiers wouldn’t have been necessary (bombing would’ve done the trick in killing people, obviously).

And now that the war of the Taliban against the army and forces of the Pakistani government seems to have found new fuel, it will be even more important to boost the moral on both sides of the border (that is, the moral of our allies. Not the moral of the Taliban). For more on this I suggest “The War On Pakistan” by Walid Phares.

Recent violence related to elections also underlines, as if it were necessary, the need for more security (in other words more troops). As the Economist reports:

For years the UN has clung to its reputation as a neutral arbiter, and managed to avoid becoming a militant target. But now the Taliban have declared that anyone involved in organising the “soap opera” of an election is a legitimate target. A spokesman for the movement said the carnage in Kabul was just the beginning.

Corruption will not evaporate and peace and stability will not return by internal processes. Without the financial, political and military aid of the USA and UN Afghanistan will not be able to barricade the Taliban’s struggle for power. Many, including myself, place a lot of responsibility on the shoulders of Mr. Obama. He must not give up hope. It’s a pity that European countries are so reluctant to help him.

Abdullah Abdullah decided not to participate in the upcoming Afghan elections. All of his proposals to make sure the elections would be at least fairer than last time were rejected out of hand, and he seems not to be interested in another campaign.

In any other country this would be a severe blow to basis democratic values or principles. But the deteriorated state of Afghanistan is impervious to this, since it is, in my view, quite clear that whatever happened, Abdullah would never be able to win the battle against Karzai. Winning the battle means attracting more than 50% of votes, which is by law the minimum a candidate needs to get in order to become president. And that, even if the August elections were as fraudulent so as to be worthy of Soviet-history, does seem all but likely.

And of course we cannot speak of a situation in which democracy did not receive a blow. By any means it did. What is now being experience however is an on lingering effect of elections that now seem to have been much more important relative to the efforts that were put into them. It is not the Afghan people that committed fraud to the elections; it’s the political establishment that did it. And the United Nations and States were unable to prevent this. The result is that Afghanistan will have a president without legitimacy, backed by an unknown part of its people, or that some alternative solution will need to be sought. What the latter can be without becoming as illegitimate as Mr. Karzai himself is an open question though. By sketching weird scenarios of interim-presidents you cannot possibly legitimize power any more than you can do at this very moment, especially not when Abdullah’s name is in the air (no supporter of Mr. Karzai will give his/her support to this in any case).

I also see the role of the Western countries as something that is hard to define. Any stances that are more than those of polite interest will all too quickly be interpreted as “Western imperialism”.  As an alternative way of wishful thinking we might suppose that there is one last straw op hope we can grab hold of. Presidents are important in power and prestige from our Western point of perspective, but to the Afghan people, the regional scene of politics is much more important. The far cry that national policy making is to daily affairs, makes sure that they are much more interested in regional politics, because these get much closer to touching people’s needs and desires.

But as I said, despite its partial truth, it remains wishful thinking. Surely it is better and more enduring to build or re-create a society from bottom to top, but that is just not what’s happening here. The fraudulent ways walked by politicians have made people skeptics about trustworthiness and integrity. Recent times have proved their point.