Kosovo’s candidate status for the EU is more problematic than any of the previous states that are in preparation for entrance to the 27 counting political body, except maybe for Turkey’s yet undecided political-geographical nature. Both inside and outside of Kosovo, we are confronted with a staggering list of problems, some of which are sensitive political issues, making any quick resolution unlikely.

Out of 27 EU countries, there remain five that do not recognize Kosovo’s independence (for various reasons); EULEX’s latest report was largely characterized by a lack of criticism; organized crime is nowhere near being tackled; witness protection programs need implementing; Serbs in the North need recognition; electoral and constitutional reforms are a must; and media independence is found only in the dictionary. The list goes on.

The European question is: Should Kosovo be named an official candidate for accession?

Politically, the answer is a fine line to walk. The EU refers to Kosovo as a body politic only and exclusively within the terms as defined by the United Nations in Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), yet this has not prevented the EU from trying to improve political ties by both influencing attempts at reform as well as frequently meeting to enable Stabilization Tracking Mechanisms, a Kosovo oriented version of the Stabilisation and Association Process that keeps track and directs reforms required to access Europe’s internal market.

The decision to step was a pragmatic one. No one needs nor benefits from a politically and economically isolated region; a region, moreover, that is itself dependant on the EU, which is by far its biggest trading partner. Granting candidacy status will mean the infamous carrot dangling as a reward, and “change means membership, membership means change”.

To get even as far as candidacy status, however, Kosovo needs to – with the help of EUlex – improve EU law coordination, upgrade its public administration and police & judicial system. After the last waves of new EU countries many politicians have become wary of expansion at too quick a rate, though, and – as one MEP put it – “discrimination, judicial refrorm etc. etc., it doesn’t matter, admitting this country into the EU means allowing in a county with a 45% jobless rate”.

Of course matters are not that simple. Of admitting Kosovo is not yet a chance, especially as we can’t scathe over the issue of statehood recognition. As this is not a decision in the hands of the European Parliament, they saw the time fit for a public statement, calling for an EU wide step towards affirming independence collectively, which is sound thinking – in the sense that the EU needs to deal with its own backyard as a collective body – yet also an immense underestimation of the political weight of sovereignty. (The EP – or a majority vote, to be more precise – sees no objections either to allow them to join the Schengen zone).

Financially, Kosovo would drain more money from the European Union budget, of course. On the other hand, it already does so anyway, albeit via different routes. Joining the internal market and modernizing the ‘state’ would give the medal another side: More money might flow in, but its own productivity would receive a boost which would, in the long run, increase self-dependancy of what might or might not be a European state, but which in all books is a European region.

Pressing countries into Kosovo-recognition seems to many not to be an option, yet the landscape has changed since the declaration of independence, and in the end this might prove compelling enough to take the process a step further. (A long shot, I admit, as all current member states need to approve entrance). In the meantime, EUlex needs to be propped up, subjected to better oversight and more critical reviews than is now the case. No one fares well with reports that speak of what one would like to see, rather than what is seen. Decreasing market obstacles would be a positive step, too, as there is a lack of foreign direct investment. And as a last intermediate step,  the possibility of land swaps with Serbia should be considered.

“We must uphold our pledges”, we cannot keep them out forever. War, instability and subsidies without rigorous reform might very well turn out to be more expensive than membership of a country that, in the words of Watson, “overcame a constitutional crisis, is on the right track and receives our full support”.

At this time,  the European Union enlargement issue is a national issue, and one could argue that it should be a European topic of debate. (In that sense, Parliament – well done). Naturally, as long as the Council calls the shots, its members will want to answer to their national constituencies, thereby fading any hope for a smooth resolution, however much it might be in everyone’s best (economical) interest.

You can read EUlex’s report here. (A foreign affairs committee has discussed the issue last Wednesday in the EP).