Forcing an economical reality into a new political mould, against the will of many, cannot be done without legitimacy. Legitimacy is just what Eurozone members seem to be lacking at this precise moment, equalled only by their lack of determination and decisiveness. What newspapers such as the Economist argued for over sixteen months ago, European leaders are now slowly, very slowly, turning into a reality – but not one that was born out of political sense; new steps see the light of day thanks to a persistent outlook of economical capital punishment.

Today’s star ensemble lead by Merkel and Sarkozy must find today’s news as tiresome as those who are in support of a strong European market with a shared currency, but the tone of Eurosceptic newspaper would top any all time frustration list. Hardliners make good headliners, but the question if the Euro is in our – or more in particular, the Northern countries turning their wallets upside down to prevent a push over the brink – best interest is an open question. It will probably remain an open question as well, since we do not have definite standards of measurement, let alone objective ones (if such a term in economics even has a referent).

Public sentiment offers answers, but ‘understanding does not occur when we try to intercept what someone wants to say to us by claiming we already know it’ (H.G. Gadamer).  Everything depends on how something is said, but whatever is said depends on some (often implicit) question. I remember well the last European elections in the Netherlands. As with all of them, battles were fought to persuade public sentiment, although most of these battles were about national issues, or a ‘pro or anti EU’ message at best. An ad by Dutch liberals D66 summed it up nicely: ‘Europe, yes!’ It was a pro-European cry, an antidote to wavering old sentiments about a 27 nation state – and counting – construction site. Was it also an affirmative reply to a union without borders, more central governance and a constitution? Only a more elaborate answer can tell.

Naturally, an example taken from a political campaign need not at all be a mirror-like reflection of how parts of the media take on Europe as a political reality. But at last, Europe became a political reality for the many. For decades the EU grudgingly witnessed the result of its founding moments; invisibility waning into irrelevance. Hence plans were laid out, dating as far back as the 70’s, of getting rid of that awful gap between Eurocrats and citizens. Jewel among all attempts was a representative body for the people of Europe, which faced its first elections in 1979.

A glance at the history of the European Parliament alone suffices as an illustration of the depths of national pride, history and political struggles when faced with ‘more Brussels’. The European Parliament was an assembly, and it became parliament only when the Single European Act was ratified. Nevertheless, the French never ceased to stop calling it an assembly, whereas the Germans never failed in having it named parliament. The European Parliament was there for the citizens of Europe, something altogether different than a European Citizen, a fact politicians were well aware of. With the Treaty of Maastricht the Council’s machinery finally succeeded in the implementation of European citizenship, unimportant in the minds of voters, but a significant victory for Brussels’ insiders. The fact that it was perceived as significant sums it up: Games played with words, laid out in detours and compromises in treaties (an example of this would be an older article I wrote concerning the European flag and symbols).

Yet do not underestimate the power of compromise in the EU at all costs. It has  been the only channel through which a constant flow of change, albeit good or bad, was able to progressively flow in one direction, that of enhanced cooperation. That does not change the first and foremost conclusion political leaders ought to have come to: To date, no treaty has ever been inspirational enough to convert citizens to European citizens.

The task of European leaders

Financial crisis make good newspaper headlines. Financial crisis also turned able in creating manoeuvre space. Issues held to be politically impossible after Lisbon Treaty ratification were suddenly perceived as necessities for economical survival: Bail-out funds, a centralized Eurozone governance, automatic sanctions and perhaps even Eurobonds. No one seems to like them, except the European Commission which would probably not mind to usurp extra political territory. An illustrious case in point would be Angela Merkel’s u-bends from the past eighteen months or so. First she failed to step up and take the lead, failing to recognize the depth of the problems and thereby estranging herself from the rare, but existing, self proclaimed Europhiles, not to mention the many economists who advocated pro-active steps in tackling the Eurozone’s problems. Then it turned out Greece did need a bail-out, after which came Ireland, another Greek bail-out, the European Financial Stability Mechanism and the numerous forecasts of the Eurozone apocalypse.

With public sentiments going in opposite direction, these reforms, cheaply sold as an economical necessities, will need explanation in several senses: Not just what they mean for one constituency by being explained by a national leader to an electorate, but what it means for Europe and the Eurozone, and why – if we want to keep a single currency – further integration is our only viable option. Also, the consequences of ditching the Euro would have to be spelled out, in as far as this is possible (as there is a lot of guesswork involved).

Of course all in retrospect is easy and simple. Only in retrospect does something manifest itself as an impossibility, as a necessity forced into a reality that could only have been different when actors chose a different course of action. The questions we now ask are unrelated to those of a year ago, at least in that sense. We are again faced with an oncoming Greek bail-out. We have yet to decide on founding centralized economic governance. But sentiments abound, and sentiments do not always help. Europe has now become a political reality for the masses. In a way, we now perceive of it as a given – something we can be happy or unhappy about, but at least something that is there. It has also become something we now started questioning, but to cite Gadamer again, the art of asking questions is more difficult than giving answers.

Therein lays an important role for our politicians and our media. Politicians should do a better job at explaining the failings of the systems, describe more carefully the steps they are taking and, naturally, why they are taking them. In Brussels, and especially in the Council of Ministers, compromise always demands a seat on the table. All too often this leads to national leaders bringing legislation home, only to explain what this means for us, as citizens of a nation sate. Europe is irrelevant. Victory will be declared if the national citizens can be happy about it – defeat will be recognized when it is the interest of them, and naturally Brussels, in the most unfriendly of voices, will be blamed.

Newspapers as the traditional media have an important role to play here. Even despite their declining sales, their influence is paramount in many segments of society, but stationing journalists in Brussels is not cheap, nor is it always easy to come up with a good story. Truth is, though, that some of the best, most thorough, detailed and careful analysis of the Eurozone’s problems are to be found online, often on bloggers sites. A shift from merely bringing news to analysis is another way that only seldom gets done properly, with the notable exception of The Economist, whose Charlemagne is generally well worth reading. With the number of documents published online by the EU and their aims to increase transparency in decision making, there is a vast amount of information to be found for anyone that wants to dig for new insights.

All this became more relevant for the EU’s continuing existence, when questions are being raised about the Euro’s sustainability, about the prospects of EU membership, not to mention those who dare flirt with the consideration of leaving the union. If all were as simple as that, even our leaders would by now have come up with a solution. We can ask ourselves if we ought to pay another round for Greece or should we (could we?) throw them out of the Eurozone? What if this means another financial crisis with collapsing banks and new bail-outs? These are not simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions, they are questions that require ongoing debate and well considered answers.

The same goes for the European Parliament amendments to what is known as the ‘six pack’, which is a set of laws aimed at centralizing economic-decision making with a stronger role for the European Commission. In sceptic terminology, this would undoubtedly mean a loss of sovereignty, hence no-go area. But questions can alter a story as much as your perspective on it. We should ask ourselves firstly what it is we want: Do we want to prevent another financial crisis and try to stop this one while we still have the chance? This is not a ‘yes or no’ question, this is an open question, a ‘how’? Even loss of sovereignty is not as rigid a concept as might seem. States will only have to deal with the commission if they trespass the maximum deficit rules, thus keeping everything in their own hands as long as collective agreements are not broken. And do we really expect, after all we have had to witness recently, that seventeen countries with one currency will prove a long term stable block if there is no authority to keep them in check? Leviathan will preside, unless anyone still believes the market should reign.

Epicentre of economical politics

In last week’s article “How to save the Euro”, The Economist proposed ring fencing all solvent Eurozone countries with a virtually unlimited bail-out fund, while at the same time recognizing defeat on Greece by leading it into (selective) orderly default. Despite flourishing critiques flung at the European Central Bank for trespassing the point where economics becomes politics, this would entail a larger role for the – on paper – independent bank, much to the frustration of the Germans (on whose Bundesbank the ECB was modelled). Ring fencing the rest of the Eurozone is going to cost a lot of money, as would a selective default of Greece, but as you can read in the article just cited, the alternative might be a doom scenario from an altogether different league.

Two points from this article’s perspective are then to be stipulated:

• More economic integration and cooperation are unavoidable requirement for a continuing single currency zone;
• Politicians need to defend and explain their steps with their hearts in it, rather than grudgingly stumbling along.

Failing to convey an unpopular political message by reluctantly stepping into the spot light will not influence public opinion enough to drastically alter the current climate, which is bound to turn economic integration into an even messier affair, especially when a new treaty or amendments to older ones are sought as part of the solution.

Treaty debates are as painful as anything in European politics, not just because the road to ratification has time and again proven to be hazardous business, also because the epicentre of economical integration will be located somewhere in Brussels’ bureaucracy. The European Commission would feel as the most natural option, as it is (supposed to be) an independent body working for the greater European good, not being troubled by national inheritances. Yet it is also unelected, faceless and far removed from citizens, in what would be a political issue far beyond the weight anything the commission has ever had under its sceptre. The European Parliament, as the alternative, is elected – but it cannot claim to speak for voters, as it lacks a legitimately accepted constituency, and has hardly been able to rid itself of its stamp of incompetency.

A matter of concern not in need of underestimation; whereas short term solutions might keep catastrophe at bay, legitimacy – to jump back to the introduction – is a serious issue, and in European affairs, threat. If it is to be dealt with at all, serious reflection on state building would be essential, because – however you may despise that terminology – that is what it is about. You could, as argued by Luuk Van Middelaar in his book ‘Passage to Europe’, compare this with Iraq: The invasion went relatively smooth, but it was obvious the matter of state building hadn’t received enough attention, that is until the situation was out of control. Europe’s history, too, is scattered with laws failed and passed, treaties written and erased. Erecting buildings from the ground is different than erecting political realities (although judicial realities are easier realized). A state is accepted as status quo, but how to get to the point of general acceptance? As mentioned earlier, the irony is that the Eurozone’s perceived failing has done exactly that, albeit topped with an acid covering of sarcasm and scepticism. Europe is a reality, a political realm that matters now in every day debates, as it has done for farmer lobbies for decades (something from which a lesson or two might be drawn).

Our struggle for a stable European currency is not at its last stand yet, and before it is, it will face more of the same. A collapse never seemed likely, but with every uncertain day that passes, it does become more probable. Maybe one day we will then label failure as an inevitable consequence of 17 countries, no governance.