Dutch commission on Iraq

In January of 2009 the Dutch government erected a commission burdened with the task of investigation procedures, reasons and mistakes that were made in 2003, when America and the U.K. decided to invade Iraq, which got political support of the Netherlands.

This report has now finally materialized. Over 500 pages present a wide, partly historical view, of what happened in the early years of this millennium, without forgetting processes that have taken place years, or even decades, earlier, which have seen much Dutch political meddling.

It could be argued that little weight might be given to anything that focuses solely on Dutch politics when it comes to these grand, international matters. In general, that would be correct. But although this investigation stems from a relatively small country; it still is a bold underline to an already fiercely debated topic. A general trend towards more objective criticism on government decision procedures and involvement can be spotted in more countries, of which the U.K. is of course one, wherefore I thought bringing this news was relevant to a more general public.

Too bad little is presented in the result of this investigation that was not previously known. On the contrary, there was disappointment on the lack of rigor in condemning the Dutch government. One journalist, who was a guest in evening talk-show ‘De Wereld Draait Door’, repeated what he had stated before by saying that “already in 1998 we knew that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction” and that the Netherlands, who promised no military involvement, “participated in exploration with F16’s”.

Problem here is the evidence. The sources who speak of F16-usage are anonymous, so their reliability is as questionable as anything. Even so, many people were willing to dig deeper into this issue. David and his men, however, decided to opt for the road supported by the arm of law, neglecting opportunities that could have given us a more profound insight. Their reason for doing so was not persuasive: It could very well be that these sources, possibly military ones, were not allowed to have spoken out in the first place, wherefore the material could be considered illegal and is better ignored. As there wasn’t much more to go on, they dropped it.

Leaving that behind, there still remains a lot to be discussed. Some of this is Dutch politics only; much of it touches broader concerns. It is quite reasonable to suspect that, if the Dutch government knew Saddam did not have weapons of mass destruction, then so did U.K. and U.S.A. governments. It is equally reasonable to conclude that no country fought a war that can be called legitimate via the chosen route. And while the U.S.A. and U.K. directly fuelled the whole process, The Hague showed lack of spine in their response. In a sense they can be said to have fared even worse: Deciding not to go forth and support America, like France and Germany had also done, would have been wise, sound, responsible and, not in the least sense, justified.

The whole affair was messy and obscure, right from the start. The Dutch parliament did not know that the American government filed an official request for support to build up military forces for an Iraq-invasion on November 15^th, 2002. Only in January 2003 more light was shed on the issue, when prime-minister Balkenende weakly and unconvincingly joined the debate. Gathered information by the AIVD, the Dutch CIA only without torture affairs, and the MIVD (Military intelligence/information and security unit) had also provided the Dutch parliament with their reports and viewpoints on an Iraqi invasion, in a much more nuanced tone than those from foreign intelligence organizations. These were all too readily and easily cast aside, fitting with the picture that it no longer mattered: A decision had already been made.

Now this is definitely something clearly stated by the Davids-commission in their book, which I am not about to summarize to you. The facts that I just mentioned already point out where problems can be found. First of all, the government did not extensively, if at all, use available sources. Second, their opinion was formed quickly and emotionally, rather than via a route of reasoned argument (even without taking sources into account). Third, de Hoop Scheffer, then minister of foreign affairs, had a ridiculous and profound influence over the decision procedure. In a time span of less than an hour something as important as a war got its first, if still temporal, approval. Accusations that de Hoop Scheffer only gave his support to the war in order to get the secretary-general job at the United Nations were proven to be baseless; even if he did only get the job because of support, he did not provide it in order to get it.

An extra dimension is brought in by voters. Polls suggest little support among citizens for political support without military support (46% opposed this, while 43% supported it), but even less backing existed for ‘full-blown’ military support (only 18% ). What probably was the most important conclusion, in my eyes, was that whatever may have happened, an attack on Iraq without UN support or mandate was unjustified. And this was no secret. Practically every citizen was aware of this; the only ones seemingly still able to ignore this were politicians, of whom Dutch prime-minister Balkenende was one until yesterday-evening, when he finally gave in and admitted mistakes made by him and his party: Support for the war arrived too quickly, and should not have been given without the UN’s mandate. On the other hand, on a side note, it could be stressed that from an American perspective this arguments is less important. We should not expect them to wait going to war if they think the cause to be a legitimate one. Security is a complex issue these days, and the bureaucratic systems of Europe are often slow and not transparent. Only this argument is deflated not just by a lack of suitable and reliable evidence that could justify a war, but the absence of it on the whole.

There is one small upside to this new report. If forces Dutch parties that were involved towards recognizing mistakes. As I just mentioned this did not go down easy with Balkenende, who is the leader of the christian democrats (CDA). He refused to take over the document’s conclusions, stubbornly holding onto a view that made you think they took a wise decision to the best of his and his party’s abilities. Well, if it truly is the best you were able to pull off, it might be better to give up politics altogether. His stance has nearly led to a pre-mature break-up of the governing coalition. Sadly, it did not get this far: A full day of talks prevented early elections.