“Britain is not in the single currency, and we’re not going to be. But we all need the Eurozone to have the right governance and structures to secure a successful currency for the long term.And those of us outside the Eurozone also need certain safeguards to ensure, for example, that our access to the Single Market is not in any way compromised. And it’s right we begin to address these issues now. ” [Cameron's speech]

No, it would have been right to begin addressing these issues at least a good two or three years ago. There is no news peeking round the corner in Cameron’s otherwise well written, historically charged and accurate, yet nevertheless rather dull and uninspiring speech.

War on our continent has become unimaginable, as the horrors of an occupying force, death and starvation have become almost repressed in our collective European psyche. Yet it never has been just about war – it was about reconstruction too. We did not create the High Authority (the Commission’s predecessor) solely to prevent war; Europe’s visionaries had something else in mind, something which shows in paraphrasing Hallstein, who early in our EU history had the nerve to lack the characteristic of modesty, describing himself as ‘sort of a prime-minister of Europe’.

But even in the 50’s and 60’s one will find a debate with a similar bottom-line. The United Kingdom valued its sovereignty (and rightly so, especially so soon after the war) and was unwilling to concede powers to an economic community that had the objective to become more than a mere free-trade zone. It was not alone in this, Charles de Gaulle, a charismatic but rather stubborn former French president, envisioned a Europe of nation states, i.e. an intergovernmental body.

To him and what is now known as ‘the empty chair crisis’  do we owe the Luxembourg compromise. The Luxembourg compromise is a fine way to underline both the union’s weaknesses and strengths. A compromise is by its very nature not the ideal solution. An apparently unproblematic perspective. Yet we would kid ourselves if we deny a place to compromise, which has not just been our main mode of transport towards better cooperation, it has proven to be an asset and instrument against stagnation. Even when the economic bloc lacked one of its founding members, it remained alive and able to function. The decision making process proceeded to majority voting despite the French demands, who were satisfied by the introduction of the European code of ‘vital national interests’, which to this day will help a member state blocking new legislation even though it finds itself isolated or part of a minority. The fact that countries are in some circumstances willing to back a neighbour, even though they might be in favour of the legislation, shows a common purpose and understanding that has become part of a European political culture.  When political theorists, philosophers, journalists or politicians point towards a democratic gap, it is there that one should look, not because there is one, but because there isn’t.

What’s the point of putting this into writing, one might ask. Well, what is put at stake in many contemporary debates is nation state versus european state. What is actually happening, however, is nation states cooperating with other nation states by means of an intricate network. A network that finds its beating heart in Brussels, but would quickly cease doing so if, for instance, weekly meetings of the Committee of Permanent Representative would fail in its deliberative tasks. The European Union is not there merely because we agreed to the Treaties (if anything half of what the Treaties stipulate has never become reality anyway); it is there because, over the years, we have put chess pieces into place that can exert a causal role on system and society and, depending on which peace one picks, this role will exert greater or lesser influence, but there is nothing beyond this causality.

Still don’t get it? Mr. Cameron wants to repatriate powers. I know he states it more subtle  than that by saying “power must be able to flow back to member states, not just away from them.”  This was indeed promised by European leaders at Laeken, and carefully written down into our treaties (it is known as the principle of subsidiarity). But it is hard to turn a process upside down that has been shaped and consented to by member states, including the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern-Ireland. Brussels’ power has always been granted with plenty of checks and balances, which makes it all the more disappointing that in member state politics the blame for what is being disliked so frequently falls on Brussels, while credit is swiftly ascribed to or claimed by the government holding office. This is, of course, nonsense. The Council, Committee of Permanent Representatives and the ties between an MEP and his or her national political party are three pillars that, on their own, should suffice in giving the government plenty of opportunity to express its dismay.

In any case, national capitals are strongholds with a causal effect much greater than any of the intermediate institutions they need to reach results in Brussels, even though both are essential nevertheless. Brussels is a mighty piece indeed, but why should this be surprising? It is, after all, the epicentre of what our politicians have been working on for decades and, moreover, it is mighty only because it is a hub – it is the place where 27 nation state leaders meet in the Council; the place where the European Parliament resides.  Much like London is the financial centre of the world, to which no bank can claim individual credit but will nevertheless claim its place in the network, the member states partaking in the EU should think along similar lines. The ideological side of federalism versus (more) intergovernmentalism should be rendered moot. It is not about a choice of terminology, it is about choosing what is the best way to aim for prosperity, global influence and public safety and health.

We are currently stuck in the middle with each other, so to speak. We would almost be able to say we live in a different world then when the Treaty of Paris was signed in ‘51, yet the debate remains essentially the same. What direction is it we want to go in and will it involve a one or two-tier structured European Union:

“And those of us outside the Eurozone also need certain safeguards to ensure, for example, that our access to the Single Market is not in any way compromised.”

David Cameron is right in asserting this, but also slightly naive. Thinking that anyone can expect to remain at the forefront of the European Union’s internal market, of which – regardless of your political views – the Euro has become an integral part, a currency of which many are fond and proud, is probably misguided. European leaders were wrong to think a new currency would work without centralized economic governance, if they really ever thought it would anyway. Ironic, perhaps, but even though the Lisbon Treaty was a defeat for federalists in the sense that it came without the promises of grandeur and change citizens always found in previous treaties, the Euro held a pathway to integration that was quite unforeseen. What we don’t need according to Mr. Cameron, however, is more of the same because it

“…will not secure a long-term future for the Eurozone. More of the same will not see the European Union keeping pace with the new powerhouse economies. More of the same will not bring the European Union any closer to its citizens. More of the same will just produce more of the same – less competitiveness, less growth, fewer jobs.”

What the speech lacks, rather problematically, is how he envisions this. “Completing” the internal market would involve an eventual enlargement of the European Monetary Union, permanent stability mechanisms, European-wide oversight for the financial sector, partial tax-harmonisation that will undoubtedly come to involve coordinated policies and harmonisation of consumer and copyright law. The list could go on for a while, yet all of these steps will involve more, not less of the European Union.Sell that to your backbenchers before wasting our time.

viagra

A debate about Europe’s spending on Egypt can follow numerous strands of thought, from the austerity driven North of Europe, to panic stricken citizens that find their country can manage on their own no longer, to Egyptians demanding democratic, economical and or religious reforms.

Quite literally, billions of Euros have already been shipped, while a staggering new amount of cash will be re-directed. For many Europeans this poses a problem. Arguments frequently run like this: (1) We face times of austerity, (2) have bailed-out other member states, (3) do not trust the EU’s bureaucracy and (4) already demand a decrease of capital-flows towards the European centre.

Not an argument one would cast away light-heartedly, but for the European Union there is a lot at stake: (5) Ever since the EU’s founding fathers signed the Treaty of Paris, Europe has been open towards that which it does not include, (6) has shown an emphasis on human rights and democracy and (7) aims to improve its own economical situation.

Being open towards non-member states has not been easy, in fact it probably never has been when an interest holds sway that is not, albeit real or imaginary, your own. A prime example would be De Gaulle infuriating his colleagues in the 60′s by keeping the British out, twice. Egypt, however, is undeniably not a part of Europe, and hence by virtue of the EU’s Treaties it can only find itself excluded. There are now two essential questions: (1) How far is the EU willing to go in assisting young, foreign democracies and (2) does the current regime in Egypt deserve our help?

All other questions in this debate should, for the time being, be rendered moot and traced back to a different point of origin. Rather unfortunately, however, points 1-4 have become dangerously common in the (extreme) right- and left-wing of the political arena. The danger here is not a direct link between these arguments and the money pledged to Egypt, but a populist stance that joins simple economics, with populist politics. Neither the European Commission, the European Parliament nor the Council would sign a cheque worth five billion Euros without prior meetings, internal deliberations, checks & balances and the opportunity to keep track of progress to see if their recommendations are put into practice.

EU-Egypt Task Force results

Truth be told, the documents provided by the European Union do not promise an effortless read, and distilling facts and figures can prove tiresome. There is, however, quite ‘straightforward’ material available on this particular topic here, here and here.

Last year’s November set the stage for an EU-Egypt task-force, but Commission vice-president Antonio Tajan also presided over a Business and Tourism summit, attracting over a hundred European business leaders that deliberated on a large number of topics, including

• commercial ties;
• economical cooperation;
• tourism;
• political reform;
• asset recovery;
• human rights;
• infrastructure;
• and information technology.

Much of this is reflect in what was eventually agreed to, which is why it is somewhat odd that some much can be read about extravagant sums of money, yet so little about the involvement of the European Bank of Research and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), European Commission, French Development Agency (AfD), National Indicative Programs (NIP) and the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF).

Here is a brief overview of the institutions involved, as well as their respective share of the bill:

• EBRD: Egypt will become a ‘Country of Operations’, making it eligible for funding, in this case of up to one billion Euros of loans, depending on annualized needs. Priorities will be given to the private sector, increasing Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), agribusiness, food industries etc.

• The EIB’s focal point will be the private sector, key infrastructure projects and job creation (the latter will – if possible – find its emphasis in decreasing youth-unemployment and increasing education standards). This year alone will see an investment of up to 750 million Euros in four different projects, two of which were signed as part of the Task-Force’s agreements (worth €245 million). Most of the money will be lent, not spent.

On top of this, the EIB will scale up its risk capital operations by a new growth and transition fund of roughly €60 million that should help equity investment for SME’s, as well as serve financial institutions that aim to improve access to capital for the aforementioned, micro enterprises and the self-employed.

• A €253 million grant, consisting out of €90 million from the Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth Across the Southern Neighbourhood, and €163 million from the Neighbourhood Investment Facility, which will accompany loans in several sectors for 2012-2013.

• The Task Force also agreed to establish a Budget Support operation of up to €200 million that will be fully aligned with the government’s Socio-economic programme. This operation will combine existing bilateral funding (up to €110 million) and the additional money that has been made available under the SPRING programme (€90 million). The Programme will be designed in partnership with other donors.

• Lady Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High Representative, signed three deals on behalf of the Commission, with a total worth of about €82 million. The primary targets set are supporting agriculture, small- and medium enterprises (SME’s), enhancing trade & the domestic market and expansion of the Cairo Metro. Points (1) and (2) shall be placed under the wings of the NIP, (3) will be part of the NIF:

1.      Supporting agriculture, with an emphasis on improving access to capital. This is a joint program with the AfD. The Commission grants €22 million, the AfD €30 million.
2.      In order to enhance trade and the domestic market, the Commission has made €20 million available, which will be used in support of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, in order to achieve better regional- and global integration.
3.      Cairo Metro expansion: The Commission will make €40 million accessible; the AfD and EIB are willing to lend up to €300 and €600 million respectively, while the private sector allegedly has to cough up a rough €1.4 billion.

Egypt’s junction

These are hardly small figures, hence the EU has some explaining to do, but admittedly that has never been her strong-suit. Thankfully, reservations are not uniquely found among non-politicians, and there are others who keep an eye on political systems and the economies that come with them. Currently lead by Christine Lagarde, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has returned to the global scene with a vengeance, and unlike Merkel’s untimely mistake in the Euro crisis (never expecting them to weaken demands for austerity), the EU has fixed some of her hope on Washington, expressing

“… its strong support to the urgent finalisation of an IMF programme of $4.8 billion for Egypt which will provide very positive signals to the international community, alleviate financing constraints, and provide a framework for reforms which are essential for the short term economic recovery but also for the longer term development of the country.” [source]

Documents released by the European institutions hardly ever come without ideological proclamations, even though these are generally easily recognized (they have been too well rehearsed in the past decades), yet sift through the documents, and what is being witnessed is not a break with the past – despite the altered political landscape – but a prolongation. Europe has been investing in Egypt for decades – in fact, the last ten years alone have witnessed €3.5 billion of it. Moreover, since 1979, 5.7 billion Euros has been transferred to Egypt, which – as we all know – was money happily received by the hands of a dictator and his inner circle.

Clearly, we want to prevent this in future and, indeed, all the political elements have carefully been put into place to prevent Egypt from sliding downhill once more, but in the past two decades the realization has also struck the Western world that not every battle is ours to be fought, and not everything has a price-tag. This is Egypt’s defining era, we can either help this transition and strengthen economic ties that are already firmly in place, or we can sit around and wait. What it turns out into is not up to us, and that might precisely be the dilemma.

Yesterday the Council faced the choice of a two-tier structure within Europe or a two-speed Europe, today we have a bit of both thanks to the uncompromising stance of British prime minster David Cameron. With ‘key national interests’ threatened, Cameron saw no other option than to opt-out from signing a new Treaty, which was agreed to by all 17 Eurozone member states, plus another 5 EU member states, and the others are expected to join after counselling with their national parliaments (which might, of course, fail).

Dutch PM Mark Rutte sounded optimistic at his press conference (to be viewed here), despite his generally pro-British outlook (he stressed his promise to Cameron that any decisions concerning the internal market will – insofar as possible – be taken on the 27-EU level, not beforehand in Eurozone summits). But it remains to be seen how much of this will materialize. The new treaty that has been agreed to will increase European powers, whatever fancy talk leaders give about no loss of sovereignty, and Eurozone countries are bound to increase central oversight and policy coherence.

Britain wanted to opt-outs for the City of London, for which it feared a package of economically painful measures – the so called Tobin tax on financial transactions – but neither Sarkozy nor Rutte were in favour of such a deal (Rutte and Sarkozy have, after all, the cities of Amsterdam and Paris to protect, however small financial centres these might be compared to London). Of course, there is much to be said for Cameron’s decision; he cannot scathe over this issue, especially since his own party, packed with EU sceptics, make ratifying a new treaty a semi-fairytale. And one might add, as did The Economist’s Bagehot’s Notebook, that one can question to what extent Britain has used its ‘veto’, as we now read everywhere. He did no more than what is standard procedure in intergovernmental proceedings: Using your right to vote and put it to use for your own national interest. (The treaty is not strictly speaking an EU-treaty).

A few points can be added to this: The City of London is unquestionably an essential pillar of the British economy, hence it needs careful considerations when new legislation, aimed at controlling financial instruments, are introduced. Secondly: Even though Britain did not, strictly speaking, use its veto – reality shows 23 countries proceeding, with potentially 3 more states joining in later. Thirdly, the EU apparatus will function as it always does, but with further integration approaching, will not Britain find itself behind a self-drawn veil?

The new treaty

The statement by the Euro area heads of government starts out optimistically as ever:

“…The European Union and the euro area have done much over the past 18 months to improve economic governance and adopt new measures in response to the sovereign debt crisis”. (Click here for the document).

And even though Europe’s leaders are the essential reason why the Council episodes keep going season after season, I am more optimist about the steps of the past two days than over anything achieved last year. As I wrote yesterday, the Deauvilleagreements have been reconsidered, thus France and Germany’s compromise on private sector involvement in exchange for a weak form of semi-automatic sanctions have been largely reversed. On top of that, the new introduces (Council document, page 3):

1. General government budgets shall be balanced or in surplus; this principle shall be deemed respected if, as a rule, the annual structural deficit does not exceed 0.5% of nominal GDP.
2. Such a rule will also be introduced in Member States’ national legal systems at constitutional or equivalent level. The rule will contain an automatic correction mechanism that shall be triggered in the event of deviation. It will be defined by each Member State on the basis of principles proposed by the Commission. We recognise the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to verify the transposition of this rule at national level.
3. Member States shall converge towards their specific reference level, according to a calendar proposed by the Commission.
4. Member States in Excessive Deficit Procedure shall submit to the Commission and the Council for endorsement, an economic partnership programme detailing the necessary structural reforms to ensure an effectively durable correction of excessive deficits. The implementation of the programme, and the yearly budgetary plans consistent with it, will be monitored by the Commission and the Council.
5. A mechanism will be put in place for the ex ante reporting by Member States of their national debt issuance plans.

Then there are several other points agreed on:

1. Adequacy of 500bn-euro (£427bn; $666bn) limit for ESM to be reassessed
2. Eurozone and other EU countries to provide up to 200bn euros to the IMF to help debt-stricken eurozone members
3. European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to be accelerated and brought into force in July 2012

The European Financial Stability Mechanism, which will become the European Stability mechanism as of July 2012, will be increased, but financial instruments to increase its leverage will, sadly, be included (instead of just donating money that is available right away). The “donation” to the IMF is a welcome one, though. The cap of 0,5% of GDP is no more than the ‘golden rule’ I referred to yesterday: There is nothing new about it, it is a mere agreement to balance the books by agreeing that governments can lend only to fund projects that brings benefits in the future, it cannot lend because the current spending pattern is unsustainable.

In a speech to parliament earlier this week, Mark Rutte assured MP’s that any new treaty would not convey new powers to Brussels. The points just summed up are, in his view, simply measures to ensure that agreements in the Lisbon Treaty are adhered to. Nonsense. Of course the EU, or more precisely, the European Commission, will receive powers it did not possess in the past. It will review government budgets and – if it has reason to – demand it to be amended; a European Stability Mechanism is a fund that transfers money, crudely, from one country to another, and it will be a European institution taking care of this (the ECB); and when countries ignore the maximum budget deficit, the (still semi)automatic sanctions can be quickly put to motion by the European Commission, unless a qualified majority vote by the seventeen Eurozone countries rejects action (or the proposed plan).

Even so, we should be glad when all is ratified.

“…The stability and integrity of the Economic and Monetary Union and of the European Union as a whole require the swift and vigorous implementation of the measures already agreed as well as further qualitative moves towards a genuine “fiscal stability union” in the euro area. Alongside the single currency, a strong economic pillar is indispensable. It will rest on an enhanced governance to foster fiscal discipline and deeper integration in the internal market as well as stronger growth, enhanced competitiveness and social cohesion.” (Council document, page 2)

Worst of all worlds for Britain

Yet everything agreed to points to the direction we have been heading in for some time now. Not essentially a two speed Europe, I would argue, but definitely one where economical interests will be debated and converged in Eurozone summits that – whatever Rutte might say to David Cameron – are likely to be held more frequently, as well as implicitly functioning as a preparing summit for larger 27-Council meetings: If there is one things we ought to have learnt, then it is that we need to centralize our economic government to an extent, and for this it is necessary to deliberate and speak with one voice.

A two-tier European Union is what can be expected from this. A core of Eurozone members, to which more states eventually will enter (unpopular as this in the future might become, due to failure to comply with entrance demands in the past), as this has been decided in the Maastricht Treaty on the European Monetary Union and is a given right to any European Union member state (provided the demands are met). These states  will have to gather, more than once or twice a year, to sustain a healthy currency and anticipate rather than follow callous direction-hints by the markets.

Deeper integration in the internal market became all but unavoidable yesterday, and much of that which has been agreed upon is expected to enter into force as of March 2012, in itself a pretty admirable pace. Britain has unwisely excluded itself from this process, more out of fear from populism, I believe, than from a rational decision in London, because while

“….the rest of Europe needed a deal to save the Euro, the European economy, and the global financial system, Britain whined about some petty domestic interests.  Remember, most of the financial regulations the rest of the EU are talking about were actually proposed by Britain to the G20 as a way of saving the global economy.  And also remember that Britain already has a “financial transactions tax” in that stamp duty is already paid on most financial transactions in the UK.  So, what exactly was Cameron trying to veto?  I just don’t get it, and nor does anyone outside a few crazed Europhobes on the extreme right of the British Conservative party.” (Simon Hix, LSE blog)

Prednisolone

viagra uk

viagra

kamagra

viagra

The conference on the European Union’s multiannual financial framework (MFF) has just ended. In it, a listener could find three intertwining trends: (1) National governments face times of austerity, (2) while the European Union budget faces a financial era, not just because its own budget needs deciding on, but of course also because of lingering economic unease and uncertainty, and (3) the issue of legitimacy will return with a vengeance if an agreement on finances is going to be the result of horse trading and secrecy.

In current times, the last point is the most crucial for the EU as a whole. Deciding on a budget was always going to be a bumpy ride. Despite the fact that bailing-out Eurozone countries has not, strictly speaking, anything to do with the European Union budget, it certainly did not help improve the EU’s image in public perception. Faceless the Commission might have been for many citizens in the years passed, these days it seems to be Hobbes’ Leviathan, the worst of all wasteful bureaucracies. An exclamation that it is not would hardly convince any sceptic that regards the Union as an unwanted extension of national sovereignty, and mentioning the small size of the EU budget, especially compared to the EU’s gross national income, is too easy a hand to play as well.

Moreover, with national governments having to cut on their budgets in ways almost unprecedented, politicians will want to convey a message that the EU will not find an escape route that leads to an increase in budget size, whatever reassurance prior agreements has given to Brussels bureaucrats.

There are two sketches one might expect for our European budget. (1) National governments trade political issues like cattle, trying to keep all members on the table happy by harsh, intellectually unwanted compromises. This can either be done publicly or behind closed doors, but if leaders do not set out to gain results in the public interest, there is little hope they will do so publicly, hence we would again be faced by a disconnection between those governing and governed.  (2) The European leaders take an interest in Europe’s future in a different sense, at the very least by not obscuring the process that has to lead to agreement on the Multiannual Financial Framework.

Were the first scenario to occur, few would cherish hope that the Union’s budget would increase, but for maybe inflation correction. If, however, the process is relatively open (we should not kid ourselves, when cameras are upon politicians, the hallways only will witness the crucial political steps), ground will be gained on at least one issue: The public could be involved, whether that be by press publications or by personal interest. I do not consider it probable this would significantly increase the odds to a greater EU budget, yet it should be helpful in legitimizing the next budget.

The euphoria would stop dead in its tracks if government leaders would, as they usually do, present a balance of national gains and losses as opposed to European ones in front of their national constituencies. But without an open process, a lack of public knowledge will inevitably shape part of the debate. I’m not the first, nor will I be the last, who has argued that EU politics, legitimacy and popularity depends as much on what government officials tell their own constituencies, or more important how they convey agreements were reached (i.e. we decided instead of ‘Brussels’ made me), and it is no different now.

In the concluding words of the EU’s conferences on the MFF, a number of questions were asked that relate strongly to this issue: Where does European money go? What is it spent on? Answering these questions is a relatively simple task if ones dives into the archives and traces where it does actually end up, yet this would only be the case if (1) the money ended up where it was supposed to end up, (2) the original spending intentions match the results achieved in reality and (3) the public recognized this as a good, i.e. justifiable, cause.

Nothing of this would find support if no attempt is made to deliver the message and convince people that Europe is more than mere solidarity with member state, or an endless well for money deposits. Voters know our economies are intertwined beyond anything we’ve witnessed before – not just the Eurozone, but the global financial market, too. For some reason, it is easy to grasp – or accepted – that China and the U.S.A. are an essential part of our economies; we cannot prosper if they stumble and fall.

That, then, is the task of Europe’s leaders. Not just to alleviate the short term financial pain all countries are bound to witness in the months or years to come, but to convince, to show, that Europe’s internal market is an invaluable asset to integration and wealth, something well worth striving for, and something that, due to its size, tasks and complexity, requires a budget that enables it to achieve its objectives.

kamagra

Forcing an economical reality into a new political mould, against the will of many, cannot be done without legitimacy. Legitimacy is just what Eurozone members seem to be lacking at this precise moment, equalled only by their lack of determination and decisiveness. What newspapers such as the Economist argued for over sixteen months ago, European leaders are now slowly, very slowly, turning into a reality – but not one that was born out of political sense; new steps see the light of day thanks to a persistent outlook of economical capital punishment.

Today’s star ensemble lead by Merkel and Sarkozy must find today’s news as tiresome as those who are in support of a strong European market with a shared currency, but the tone of Eurosceptic newspaper would top any all time frustration list. Hardliners make good headliners, but the question if the Euro is in our – or more in particular, the Northern countries turning their wallets upside down to prevent a push over the brink – best interest is an open question. It will probably remain an open question as well, since we do not have definite standards of measurement, let alone objective ones (if such a term in economics even has a referent).

Public sentiment offers answers, but ‘understanding does not occur when we try to intercept what someone wants to say to us by claiming we already know it’ (H.G. Gadamer).  Everything depends on how something is said, but whatever is said depends on some (often implicit) question. I remember well the last European elections in the Netherlands. As with all of them, battles were fought to persuade public sentiment, although most of these battles were about national issues, or a ‘pro or anti EU’ message at best. An ad by Dutch liberals D66 summed it up nicely: ‘Europe, yes!’ It was a pro-European cry, an antidote to wavering old sentiments about a 27 nation state – and counting – construction site. Was it also an affirmative reply to a union without borders, more central governance and a constitution? Only a more elaborate answer can tell.

Naturally, an example taken from a political campaign need not at all be a mirror-like reflection of how parts of the media take on Europe as a political reality. But at last, Europe became a political reality for the many. For decades the EU grudgingly witnessed the result of its founding moments; invisibility waning into irrelevance. Hence plans were laid out, dating as far back as the 70’s, of getting rid of that awful gap between Eurocrats and citizens. Jewel among all attempts was a representative body for the people of Europe, which faced its first elections in 1979.

A glance at the history of the European Parliament alone suffices as an illustration of the depths of national pride, history and political struggles when faced with ‘more Brussels’. The European Parliament was an assembly, and it became parliament only when the Single European Act was ratified. Nevertheless, the French never ceased to stop calling it an assembly, whereas the Germans never failed in having it named parliament. The European Parliament was there for the citizens of Europe, something altogether different than a European Citizen, a fact politicians were well aware of. With the Treaty of Maastricht the Council’s machinery finally succeeded in the implementation of European citizenship, unimportant in the minds of voters, but a significant victory for Brussels’ insiders. The fact that it was perceived as significant sums it up: Games played with words, laid out in detours and compromises in treaties (an example of this would be an older article I wrote concerning the European flag and symbols).

Yet do not underestimate the power of compromise in the EU at all costs. It has  been the only channel through which a constant flow of change, albeit good or bad, was able to progressively flow in one direction, that of enhanced cooperation. That does not change the first and foremost conclusion political leaders ought to have come to: To date, no treaty has ever been inspirational enough to convert citizens to European citizens.

The task of European leaders

Financial crisis make good newspaper headlines. Financial crisis also turned able in creating manoeuvre space. Issues held to be politically impossible after Lisbon Treaty ratification were suddenly perceived as necessities for economical survival: Bail-out funds, a centralized Eurozone governance, automatic sanctions and perhaps even Eurobonds. No one seems to like them, except the European Commission which would probably not mind to usurp extra political territory. An illustrious case in point would be Angela Merkel’s u-bends from the past eighteen months or so. First she failed to step up and take the lead, failing to recognize the depth of the problems and thereby estranging herself from the rare, but existing, self proclaimed Europhiles, not to mention the many economists who advocated pro-active steps in tackling the Eurozone’s problems. Then it turned out Greece did need a bail-out, after which came Ireland, another Greek bail-out, the European Financial Stability Mechanism and the numerous forecasts of the Eurozone apocalypse.

With public sentiments going in opposite direction, these reforms, cheaply sold as an economical necessities, will need explanation in several senses: Not just what they mean for one constituency by being explained by a national leader to an electorate, but what it means for Europe and the Eurozone, and why – if we want to keep a single currency – further integration is our only viable option. Also, the consequences of ditching the Euro would have to be spelled out, in as far as this is possible (as there is a lot of guesswork involved).

Of course all in retrospect is easy and simple. Only in retrospect does something manifest itself as an impossibility, as a necessity forced into a reality that could only have been different when actors chose a different course of action. The questions we now ask are unrelated to those of a year ago, at least in that sense. We are again faced with an oncoming Greek bail-out. We have yet to decide on founding centralized economic governance. But sentiments abound, and sentiments do not always help. Europe has now become a political reality for the masses. In a way, we now perceive of it as a given – something we can be happy or unhappy about, but at least something that is there. It has also become something we now started questioning, but to cite Gadamer again, the art of asking questions is more difficult than giving answers.

Therein lays an important role for our politicians and our media. Politicians should do a better job at explaining the failings of the systems, describe more carefully the steps they are taking and, naturally, why they are taking them. In Brussels, and especially in the Council of Ministers, compromise always demands a seat on the table. All too often this leads to national leaders bringing legislation home, only to explain what this means for us, as citizens of a nation sate. Europe is irrelevant. Victory will be declared if the national citizens can be happy about it – defeat will be recognized when it is the interest of them, and naturally Brussels, in the most unfriendly of voices, will be blamed.

Newspapers as the traditional media have an important role to play here. Even despite their declining sales, their influence is paramount in many segments of society, but stationing journalists in Brussels is not cheap, nor is it always easy to come up with a good story. Truth is, though, that some of the best, most thorough, detailed and careful analysis of the Eurozone’s problems are to be found online, often on bloggers sites. A shift from merely bringing news to analysis is another way that only seldom gets done properly, with the notable exception of The Economist, whose Charlemagne is generally well worth reading. With the number of documents published online by the EU and their aims to increase transparency in decision making, there is a vast amount of information to be found for anyone that wants to dig for new insights.

All this became more relevant for the EU’s continuing existence, when questions are being raised about the Euro’s sustainability, about the prospects of EU membership, not to mention those who dare flirt with the consideration of leaving the union. If all were as simple as that, even our leaders would by now have come up with a solution. We can ask ourselves if we ought to pay another round for Greece or should we (could we?) throw them out of the Eurozone? What if this means another financial crisis with collapsing banks and new bail-outs? These are not simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions, they are questions that require ongoing debate and well considered answers.

The same goes for the European Parliament amendments to what is known as the ‘six pack’, which is a set of laws aimed at centralizing economic-decision making with a stronger role for the European Commission. In sceptic terminology, this would undoubtedly mean a loss of sovereignty, hence no-go area. But questions can alter a story as much as your perspective on it. We should ask ourselves firstly what it is we want: Do we want to prevent another financial crisis and try to stop this one while we still have the chance? This is not a ‘yes or no’ question, this is an open question, a ‘how’? Even loss of sovereignty is not as rigid a concept as might seem. States will only have to deal with the commission if they trespass the maximum deficit rules, thus keeping everything in their own hands as long as collective agreements are not broken. And do we really expect, after all we have had to witness recently, that seventeen countries with one currency will prove a long term stable block if there is no authority to keep them in check? Leviathan will preside, unless anyone still believes the market should reign.

Epicentre of economical politics

In last week’s article “How to save the Euro”, The Economist proposed ring fencing all solvent Eurozone countries with a virtually unlimited bail-out fund, while at the same time recognizing defeat on Greece by leading it into (selective) orderly default. Despite flourishing critiques flung at the European Central Bank for trespassing the point where economics becomes politics, this would entail a larger role for the – on paper – independent bank, much to the frustration of the Germans (on whose Bundesbank the ECB was modelled). Ring fencing the rest of the Eurozone is going to cost a lot of money, as would a selective default of Greece, but as you can read in the article just cited, the alternative might be a doom scenario from an altogether different league.

Two points from this article’s perspective are then to be stipulated:

• More economic integration and cooperation are unavoidable requirement for a continuing single currency zone;
• Politicians need to defend and explain their steps with their hearts in it, rather than grudgingly stumbling along.

Failing to convey an unpopular political message by reluctantly stepping into the spot light will not influence public opinion enough to drastically alter the current climate, which is bound to turn economic integration into an even messier affair, especially when a new treaty or amendments to older ones are sought as part of the solution.

Treaty debates are as painful as anything in European politics, not just because the road to ratification has time and again proven to be hazardous business, also because the epicentre of economical integration will be located somewhere in Brussels’ bureaucracy. The European Commission would feel as the most natural option, as it is (supposed to be) an independent body working for the greater European good, not being troubled by national inheritances. Yet it is also unelected, faceless and far removed from citizens, in what would be a political issue far beyond the weight anything the commission has ever had under its sceptre. The European Parliament, as the alternative, is elected – but it cannot claim to speak for voters, as it lacks a legitimately accepted constituency, and has hardly been able to rid itself of its stamp of incompetency.

A matter of concern not in need of underestimation; whereas short term solutions might keep catastrophe at bay, legitimacy – to jump back to the introduction – is a serious issue, and in European affairs, threat. If it is to be dealt with at all, serious reflection on state building would be essential, because – however you may despise that terminology – that is what it is about. You could, as argued by Luuk Van Middelaar in his book ‘Passage to Europe’, compare this with Iraq: The invasion went relatively smooth, but it was obvious the matter of state building hadn’t received enough attention, that is until the situation was out of control. Europe’s history, too, is scattered with laws failed and passed, treaties written and erased. Erecting buildings from the ground is different than erecting political realities (although judicial realities are easier realized). A state is accepted as status quo, but how to get to the point of general acceptance? As mentioned earlier, the irony is that the Eurozone’s perceived failing has done exactly that, albeit topped with an acid covering of sarcasm and scepticism. Europe is a reality, a political realm that matters now in every day debates, as it has done for farmer lobbies for decades (something from which a lesson or two might be drawn).

Our struggle for a stable European currency is not at its last stand yet, and before it is, it will face more of the same. A collapse never seemed likely, but with every uncertain day that passes, it does become more probable. Maybe one day we will then label failure as an inevitable consequence of 17 countries, no governance.

Serophene

Contrary to popular belief, the European Union (EU) does not have an official flag, only a symbol or a logo. Politicians pulling the strings of those who were drafting the Lisbon treaty prevented it from becoming a theoretical justified reality, but why doesn’t the EU have a flag?

After the turbulent years in which two founding countries’ citizens struck down the constitutional dream of many Europeans, federalist fears are perhaps a partial answer. On request of the Dutch politicians, the treaty stuck to the old terminology of a ‘logo’, yet if a flag is perceived as a flag, then why all the hassle?

Hassle as symbolism; dread to be seen as all too European when voters would return to vote for the next government, because the European Union is the bringer of evil – costly, bureaucratic and a threat to national identity. No matter that the Lisbon Treaty leaves no doubt about the perseverance of cultures, languages and the likes, no matter that the EU’s budget is only a fraction of the combined national budget of its 27 member states. In Europe, what counts is public perception, and from that a broader lesson about public acceptation, integration and legitimacy needs to be drawn.

Symbolism & Democracy: Where they meet

The terminology of flag and anthem were present in the original form of the Constitution of the European Union. But when, in 2005, voters in the Netherlands and France presented the EU with a blatant refusal to ratify the document, these ‘nation state building’ entities disappeared from the binding parts of its successor. Yet this did not stop sixteen of the twenty seven countries recommitting themselves, in declaration 52 of the Treaty of Lisbon document, to the starred flag as their symbol, the ‘Ode to Joy (Beethoven) as their anthem.

This is a classic act of symbolic politics. Nothing noteworthy is being changed, but the story can be sold in national parliaments. This is hardly an exaggeration, for after the Treaty of Lisbon was ratified, the Dutch Parliament requested a more ‘readable version of the Treaty’. Ponder a second over what this might mean: Symbol or logo would become..? What about High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy? Common sense would probably allow replacing them with ‘flag’ and ‘foreign minister’ respectively.

Herein a crucial link can be found with the EU’s perceived ‘democratic deficit’. This, too, is something associated with the EU time and again. Moreover, it is almost hard not to stumble over these two words: You’ll find them in practically all books about the European Union’s political system. Both of these things – the flag and the deficit – are, well not two sides of the same coin, but close relatives at least. They point to a subjective fact: The absence of public, an audience. This public could be anything, from people identifying themselves as European citizens (like myself) or people with just an air of interest in what happens in Brussels. But when the absence of an audience is your problem, you’re struggling with a metaphysical ghost.

This problem, in turn, mystifies the European institutions. It creates a veil that makes it both hard to see and know what “Brussels is all about” or even more sceptical in the words of J. Clive-Matthews ‘Why no one understands the EU’[1]. Understanding the EU is a daunting task in comparison to member states, with which most citizens are familiar. The process of explanation, however, is much the same. Description of what happens, where and why must take precedence if one wants to come up with a general view of the nature of the European Union (i.e. an intergovernmental organization, a federation or simply an international organization).

This lack of transparency does not, however, have anything to do with the European institutions, or at least not any more. Political deliberations and voting procedures in the Council of the European Union (more generally known as the Council of Ministers) are broadcast on the internet, albeit at the cost that horse trading has simply moved to the hall ways. But alas, symbolism is everything these days and at least our means to attain insights have increased. The Commission has a well trained, highly educated administration that posts more on the internet than the average citizens dares to dream of reading, not to mention the renewed and invigorated use of the social media by Brussels’ officials. And the European Parliament, enriched with ever more areas of co-decision, is supposed to be the body to connect to the European citizen. That this has proved no mean feat has become clear, but we can at least admit that some MEP’s do not avoid the spotlight.

Just as we will not find out why the EU’s functioning seem opaque by looking at the system; we are not going to do away with the ‘democratic deficit’ by an increase in direct electoral procedures, and so long as that deficit remains a vibrant force in the air, the symbolism of EU politics will remain intact. Acquiring new legitimacy cannot be achieved by raising sequences of ink to life in the European Council’s treaty initiatives: That is a lesson that must be learned from history.

This points to a common source, an area in which the European Union has failed to do what it had hoped to do, although not for a lack of trying. What Brussels needs is the eye, ear, nose and feeling of this continent’s inhabitants. You can only lead the horse to water; the senses must be trained to find Brussels, not the other way around.

In the 50’s and 60’s, time was on our side. The prospect of peace and prosperity, and – more politically internal than in the hearts of the people – forecasts of Europe as a politically and economically united body kept hope alive. And to be fair, a lot of notable things have been achieved, not in the least the visa and passport free travelling and the Euro. Sadly, both have shown their downsides in public perception in the past few years. Most of us will remember the deportation of Roma-people from France, which caused an outrage, and no one needs reminding of Greece’s financial bail-out.

Resentment, then, was the Eurocrats’ award, a reassessment of loyalties the consequences. Yet resentment is an emotional factor much better at motivating people to get involved and be heard. That is something all European politician need to realize or have realized by know. Emotion is powerful, and if you learn how to play, power. Politicians all want to say what they think, but they don’t (nearly) always do so – even Thatcher met her political end by enraging party members who thought they’d risk ‘exclusion’ thanks to Britain’s reluctant cooperative stance. As Marx turned Hegel on his head, the EU needs to turn its perception on its head.

Make yourself known

The scandal evolving out of the Roma deportation; MEP’s blocking a deal with the USA over privacy; and more frequent gatherings of the European Council: A touch of glamour and a reminder that interests are at stake. Such things all do well in mobilizing the press and diverting people’s attention to the European political scene. There is nothing inherently wrong with the European Union; there is something wrong with the presentation of what it deals with. If people are to identify themselves even remotely as citizens of the EU, relevance, fascination and importance must be pillars on which this identification is built.

Anonymity is the worst of all current alternatives. In the words of Oscar Wilde, ‘the only thing worse than being talked about is not being talked about’.  There is no need for all EU citizens to be united in support or opposition – even for some member states that is an ideal, not a reality. There is only the need to make people realize that what gets decided in Brussels affects us all. There are plenty of ways in which this can be done – or at least be tried. The social media are not in the least a new way to bolster practically any image, and many Eurocrats are already in on this game. Euronews and other forms of media underwrite that worrying about ‘being talked about´ is not a fiction.

In that sense, the European Union logo can teach us a lesson or two. The success of a political union does not depend on politicians alone. Yes, they might shove the occasional unwanted legislation down our throats, but they will pay the price in steep poll dives. Our personal identification with the “European arena” is going to be decisive, so if the EU wants to be accepted, it will have to sneak into the reality as perceived by you and me – it will need to be seen as a given fact by recreating itself, going from basic symbolism to important sphere, going from logo to flag.

[1] http://www.jcm.org.uk/blog/2010/03/why-no-one-understands-the-eu/